Carlos Mario Muñoz Suàrez Santiago de
Universidad del Valle, Inscrito a:
dpto de Filosofia
Instituto de Psicología, Grupo de investigación en
filosofia de la mente y neurofilosofia: Mentis.
Mr. E. Glasersfeld, I wish give you,
honestly, my excuses for have not spelt correctly your name.
In my research the topic about the genesis of metaphisical realities constitutes
the content of the second part of the second chapter. On the other hand, the
first part of same chapter corcerns to the problem of the realism's genesis in
the common sense (and its effectiveness and relations with evolutionary
strategies) and its relations with theorical metaphisical realism, e.g.: as of
from the appearance of the scientific doubts.
For the time being I'm dedicated to explain the relationships between your
radical constructivism and my way of view, topic in wish your opinion might be
of big help.
From my point of view in front to the fact to affirms that the radical
contructivism is only a epistemological model emerges some questions: How to
forget the metaphisical realistic argument without affirm (e.g.) its
metatheorical genesis, that is to say, to make a ontological revision?
One conclusion to which I have come in my research is that the radical
constructivism is a departure point for a coherent formulation of a ontological
model. In accordance with your paper edited on Die erfundene wirlinchkeit, the
radical aspect of the constructivism is supported on the fact to configure a
model none refered to objetive reality (on classical sense) rather refered it
exclusively to our experiential and cognitive organizations. I believe that deny
or "abjure" the metaphisical realism is suffiecient for try to explain what is
the real world, the reality. I think that the departure point is
epistemological, but this carry us to ontologicals statements, therefore, to
All this differs of the radical constructivism, but if the radical
constructivism answers to the question about of the reality's genesis. Should
not it be a ontological model too?; on the other hand, concerning to the notion
of 'fit': Doesn't it depend of any answer to the question "What's (the)
Att.:Carlos M.Muñoz S.
Dear Mr. Munoz,
Staring at the end of your query, "fitting", in the context
of constructivism, is always fitting relative to the
experiential world and has nothing to do with ontology.
If constructivism provides an "explanation" of how the
notion of reality arises, this explanation is a model, not a
description of something posited as "real".
The combination "ontological model" is a contradiction. In
constructivism there can be models of the IDEA of ontology
but not models of ontology.
If I declare myself agnostic with regard to ontological
reality ('abjure' the metaphysical realism), this is not a
statement of its "existence" nor a description of it.
Radical constructivism does not concern metaphysics in any
way; it limits itself to the domain of rational thinking and
leaves metaphysics to the poets and mystics. The relation of
radical constructivism and "metaphysical realism" is a
relation of total incompatibility.
With this, dear Mr. Munoz, I wish you much success with your
struggle with metaphysics and terminate our correspondence
because I feel I am beginning to repeat my answers.
Ernst von Glasersfeld