QUESTION 1:

 

From: Carlos Mario Muñoz Suàrez Santiago de Cali, Universidad del Valle, Inscrito a: dpto de Filosofia
Instituto de Psicología, Grupo de investigación en filosofia de la mente y neurofilosofia: Mentis.

Mr. E. Glasersfeld, I wish give you, honestly, my excuses for have not spelt correctly your name.

In my research the topic about the genesis of metaphisical realities constitutes the content of the second part of the second chapter. On the other hand, the first part of same chapter corcerns to the problem of the realism's genesis in the common sense (and its effectiveness and relations with evolutionary strategies) and its relations with theorical metaphisical realism, e.g.: as of from the appearance of the scientific doubts.

For the time being I'm dedicated to explain the relationships between your radical constructivism and my way of view, topic in wish your opinion might be of big help.

From my point of view in front to the fact to affirms that the radical contructivism is only a epistemological model emerges some questions: How to forget the metaphisical realistic argument without affirm (e.g.) its metatheorical genesis, that is to say, to make a ontological revision?

One conclusion to which I have come in my research is that the radical constructivism is a departure point for a coherent formulation of a ontological model. In accordance with your paper edited on Die erfundene wirlinchkeit, the radical aspect of the constructivism is supported on the fact to configure a model none refered to objetive reality (on classical sense) rather refered it exclusively to our experiential and cognitive organizations. I believe that deny or "abjure" the metaphisical realism is suffiecient for try to explain what is the real world, the reality. I think that the departure point is epistemological, but this carry us to ontologicals statements, therefore, to ontological analysis.

All this differs of the radical constructivism, but if the radical constructivism answers to the question about of the reality's genesis. Should not it be a ontological model too?; on the other hand, concerning to the notion of 'fit': Doesn't it depend of any answer to the question "What's (the) reality?"?

Att.:Carlos M.Muñoz S.
 

 

ANSWER 1:

Dear Mr. Munoz,

Staring at the end of your query, "fitting", in the context of constructivism, is always fitting relative to the experiential world and has nothing to do with ontology.

If constructivism provides an "explanation" of how the notion of reality arises, this explanation is a model, not a description of something posited as "real".

The combination "ontological model" is a contradiction. In constructivism there can be models of the IDEA of ontology but not models of ontology.

If I declare myself agnostic with regard to ontological reality ('abjure' the metaphysical realism), this is not a statement of its "existence" nor a description of it.

Radical constructivism does not concern metaphysics in any way; it limits itself to the domain of rational thinking and leaves metaphysics to the poets and mystics. The relation of radical constructivism and "metaphysical realism" is a relation of total incompatibility.

With this, dear Mr. Munoz, I wish you much success with your struggle with metaphysics and terminate our correspondence because I feel I am beginning to repeat my answers.

Best wishes,

Ernst von Glasersfeld
 

 

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